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## **National Intelligence Daily** (Cable)

22 February 1979

State Dept. review completed

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IRAN	
A senior official of the Iranian Government complained yesterday that Ayatollah Khomeini's injunction to workers to return to work was not being followed in some industries. In the first public admission of this problem, Vice Premier Entezam blamed leftists for keeping the workers out.	25X1
We have no information on how many workers have refused to return to work or what sectors of the economy are being hardest hit. Several leftist groups are recruiting workers.	25X1
//The Marxist Chariks have apparently been vigor- ously recruiting among the workers for several months. In the crucial oil sector, Iranian authorities believe at least four leftist groups are activethe Chariks, the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party, dissident Tudeh elements, and a Trotskyite faction.//	25X1
The Chariks backed away yesterday from a potential confrontation with the regime by canceling their plan to hold a mass march on Khomeini's headquarters today; Khomeini had denounced the plan. Instead, they plan to hold a rally at Tehran University tomorrow.	25X1
The Chariks' decision to back down is consistent with their apparent strategy of avoiding a direct confrontation with the Khomeini government while harassing it by attacking "soft" targets like foreign embassies.	
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BRIEFS AND COMMENTS

TANZANIA-UGANDA: Military Situation

//Tanzanian forces closed in on the Ugandan provincia
capital of Masaka yesterday, meeting only scattered re-
sistance.
President Nyerere ap-
parently has not decided whether to permit his forces
to push farther.//

Kampala remains quiet, but there are signs that Amin's position could be imperiled if the situation worsens. Dissension among frontline troops could easily spread to the capital and undermine Amin's tenuous hold on key units.

Amin is seeking ways to end the fighting. Last weekend, he agreed to a Libyan truce proposal and announced plans to participate in an OAU mediation effort this week in Nairobi. Tanzania, however, rejected the Libyan proposal and is likely to maintain a hardline stance in the OAU discussions in the absence of African condemnation of Amin.

The West German Ambassador in Kampala reports that the three US missionaries in the Mbarara and Masaka areas should be able to flee to Kampala or the Western part of the country.

PERSIAN GULF: Pro-Khomeini Sentiment

Shia communities of the small Persian Gulf states are staging pro-Khomeini demonstrations that are sure to add to the worries of the conservative rulers of these countries.

	//Such demonstrations have so far occurred at the	
	Iranian Embassies in Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab	
	Emirates,	
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L	the countries, the Shias are economically and politically	
	discriminated against by the Sunni-controlled governments.	•
	Many Gulf Shia probably view the Iranian revolution as a	
	victory for all Shia.	1
	VICCOLY TOT ALL DILLA.	

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## ITALY: Andreotti Gives Up

Former Prime Minister Andreotti abandoned his effort to form a new government yesterday. President Pertini has announced his intention to appoint Republican Party leader Ugo La Malfa as the new prime minister - designate in a last-ditch effort to avoid an early election.

Andreotti's prospects were badly hurt last week when the Communist Party rejected his proposals. His plan apparently was to grant half the cabinet posts to the Christian Democrats and the other half to "technicians" nominated by the Communists and the other parties that supported the previous government.

Communist party chief Berlinguer suggested, in turn, that Andreotti either grant the Communists cabinet posts or permit a figure from another party to form a government. According to Berlinguer, such a government could be backed by both Andreotti's Christian Democrats and the Communists, or it could exclude the Christian Democrats.

Berlinguer suggested these alternatives in an effort to shift the blame for a new election to the Christian Democrats and to induce the Socialists--whose support is pivotal--to rule out any formula that would exclude the Communists; the Socialists yesterday flatly rejected Andreotti's proposals, and even the Christian Democrats urged Andreotti to report his failure to Pertini.

Pertini--a Socialist--reacted quickly because he is strongly opposed to an early election, which he believes would damage his own party. His choice of a Republican would be unprecedented in post-war Italy; all prime ministers - designate during this period have been Christian Democrats.

Although La Malfa could conceivably fashion a new government, his task is likely to be complicated by opposition from the Christian Democrats, who could block a workable majority. In this case, a La Malfa government would act merely as a caretaker to prepare the country for an election.

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MAURITANIA: Racial Violence

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Mauritania's fragile political fabric, already strained by its unpopular war for control of a portion of Western Sahara and by a coup last July, is being further weakened by an upsurge of racial tensions.

The 1.5 million population is split into two sharply antagonistic societies—nomadic Moors (Arab-Berbers) and sedentary blacks concentrated in the Senegal River Valley. Moors control the government, the economy, and the top ranks of the security services. Blacks, who comprise most of the enlisted ranks and who have borne a disproportionate share of casualties in fighting against Polisario forces in Western Sahara, have in recent months increasingly demanded economic and political equality.

Moorish officials and citizens seem opposed to concessions and have been angered by the blacks' demands. The general mood is now volatile; early this month a minor incident in the Nouakchott market brought large crowds into the street and forced closing of the market.

Regime leaders have blamed the unrest on "foreign and domestic saboteurs" and seem inclined to rely on repression in dealing with the problem. Tension and violence are therefore likely to intensify, and political stability is likely to erode further.

## ST. LUCIA: New Caribbean Micro-State

//The British Associated State of St. Lucia--with a population of 119,000--gains full independence today, the latest withdrawal from the British West Indies Associated States. Grenada achieved independence in 1974 and Dominica in 1978. The Associated States now consist of Antigua, St. Kitts-Anguilla-Nevis, and St. Vincent. They have internal autonomy, but defense and foreign affairs are controlled by Britain.//

//Most St. Lucians are of African descent and speak either English or a French patois. Primarily an agrarian state--over half the labor force engages in agriculture--St. Lucia depends on the export of bananas and on tourism. Unemployment is high, affecting roughly a third of the workforce. The island is characterized by forested, volcanic cones rising steeply along the coast and throughout the interior. Principal towns--such as Castries, the capital--are located in coastal bays, protected from the area's frequent hurricanes. A sheltered, deep-water harbor provides access to the capital and its 45,000 inhabitants. The island has two commercial air-ports capable of jet traffic.//

//Premier John Compton, a political moderate and able administrator, has long been widely respected throughout the eastern Caribbean. He will face tough domestic opposition, however, in an election expected later this year. George Odlum, a Cuban-oriented radical who heads the larger faction of the main opposition party, has increasing influence among the country's disaffected youth. Although associated with political violence in the past, Odlum has now apparently decided to try to unseat Compton through conventional means.//

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TURKEY: Opposition to Martial Law Extension

The major Turkish opposition party continued its assaults on Prime Minister Ecevit on Tuesday by announcing that it will vote against government legislation to extend martial law. Suleyman Demirel's Justice Party supported the original imposition of martial law last December but has consistently attacked the government for not giving the military wider authority to stem the rising political violence. By highlighting this concern to justify its decision, the Justice Party clearly aims to ingratiate itself with military leaders reportedly chafing under current government restrictions. Demirel may hope to test the discipline of Ecevit's two-seat majority on the eve of the crucial budget vote-due before 1 March.

ZAIRE: Security Situation

Zaire's Kivu Province and Kinshasa remain tense despite the failure of mercenaries to lead anti-Mobutu uprisings last weekend as they had intended. Twelve mercenaries who recently arrived in Rwanda remain in a hotel on the Rwanda-Zaire frontier

The Rwandans, with Belgian assistance, reportedly are arranging to expel them to Europe within a few days. We have no additional information on the other mercenaries who reportedly arrived in Rwanda last week as part of the anti-Mobutu plot. The Zairian Army and the advance contingent of 60 Belgian commandos at Kitona in western Zaire remain on alert. Mobutu has often followed periods of heightened tension with sweeping arrests of persons whose loyalty he suspects, and may do so again.

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